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Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of Imposing a
Standing Threshold
AMANDA LEITER*
Individuals and interest groups challenging agency action or inaction often
must allege not that they or their members have been or certainly will be
harmed by the agency's approach, but instead that they face an increased risk of
future harm. Courts struggle to analyze standing in these so-called "increased-
risk" cases: Does the elevated risk constitute the necessary injury-in-fact, or
must the likelihood of realized harm exceed a certain threshold before the case
becomes cognizable? Several circuits take the former view, but the D.C. Circuit
requires plaintiffs to establish that the alleged risk clears some indeterminate
"sufficiency" or "substantiality" bar The resulting circuit split positions the
issue for Supreme Court review, yet the theoretical underpinnings and practical
effects of the differing approaches remain largely unexamined.
Examining these issues reveals little to support imposition of a substantiality-
of-the-risk standing threshold. Neither moral nor jurisprudential theory sup-
ports the notion that small risks are inherently non-injurious, and careful
analysis demonstrates that in practice, such a threshold consistently fails to
identify increased-risk cases "worthy of review" (whatever one's definition of
that term). Worse, a threshold comes at significant cost, insulating demonstrably
injurious administrative policies from review, distracting courts from issues
more relevant to reviewability, imposing a significant financial burden on citizen
plaintiffs, and cloaking a substantive encroachment on Congress 's power to
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INTRODUCTION
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency
(NRDC I), petitioner Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged
an administrative rule that regulated production and use of the pesticide methyl
bromide.' To evaluate NRDC's standing, the D.C. Circuit calculated the "excess
fatalities" that might be expected among the petitioner's members as a result of
the rule.2 The panel's elaborate calculations were precise to the seventh decimal
place, involved more than six mathematical operations, and extended over more
than a page in the published opinion. Based on these calculations, the panel
asserted that "[e]ven if all present NRDC members were immortal" (or, more
accurately, long-lived) "we could expect to wait approximately 12,000 years
... before seeing the fitst... methyl bromide [rule]-related death."3 Accord-
ingly, the panel concluded, NRDC lacked standing to proceed.4
On reconsideration (NRDC II), the court withdrew its math-laden opinion,
conceding that some of its unstated assumptions were erroneous and that NRDC
had demonstrated a risk "sufficient to support standing."5 Significantly, how-
ever, the panel declined to revisit the threshold requirement, unique to the D.C.
Circuit,6 that an increased risk of harm can constitute the injury-in-fact neces-
1. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 1), 440 F.3d 476, 477 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (challenging
Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Process for Exempting Critical Uses From the Phaseout of Methyl
Bromide, 69 Fed. Reg. 76,982 (Dec. 23, 2004) (codified at 40 CF.R. pt. 82)), withdrawn, Natural Res.
Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 11), 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
2. See NRDC I,440 F.3d at 481-82 nn.8, 9.
3. Id. at 482 (quoting an affidavit submitted by Intervenor Methyl Bromide Industry Panel (MBIP)).
4. Id. at 484.
5. NRDC 1!, 464 F.3d at 7.
6. Cassandra Sturkie & Nathan Seltzer, Developments in the D.C. Circuit's Article III Standing
Analysis: When Is an Increased Risk of Future Harm Sufficient to Constitute Injury-in-Fact in
Environmental Cases?, 37 Erv. L. REP. 10287, 10293 (2007) (noting that in NRDC I, "the D.C. Circuit
distinguished itself from other courts of appeals.., which have suggested that an increase in probabil-
ity itself constitutes an 'actual or imminent' injury" (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Coving-
ton v. Jefferson, 358 F.3d 626, 652 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., concurring))); see also Baur v. Veneman,
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sary to support standing "only if the increase is sufficient to 'take a suit out of
the category of the hypothetical' "7-that is, only if the contemplated harm is
"substantially probable." 8 Indeed, a more recent D.C. Circuit decision confirms
that a plaintiff seeking to establish standing to raise an "increased-risk" claim
must demonstrate both (1) that the challenged agency action "creates a substan-
tial increase in... risk" and (2) that the "ultimate risk of harm to which [the
plaintiff is] exposed.., is [also] 'substantial."9 Moreover, even plaintiffs who
rely on an agency's quantitative risk assessment must convince the D.C. Circuit
that the risk identified by the agency is "substantial."' 0 That is, the substantiality
requirement does not serve only to weed out assertions of risk that rest on faulty
or inadequate science; it applies equally to assertions backed by putatively
expert agencies."
The implausibility of NRDC I's tortured mathematics is immediately appar-
ent when one turns to the relevant pages in the Federal Reporter. 12 By contrast,
the substantiality-of-the-risk standing threshold seems superficially plausible as
a safeguard to prevent "virtually any citizen" from challenging "virtually any
[agency] action."1 3 On closer evaluation, however, the threshold reveals itself as
the most far-reaching and ill-conceived maneuver in a longstanding drive to
place constitutional "constraint[s] ... on Congress's power to specify harms
that give rise to standing.",
1 4
Numerous authors have questioned the constitutional and historical under-
pinnings of that drive, explored its ramifications for separation of powers
and a well-functioning regulatory state, and observed that one effect of the
drive is to make judicial review less available to beneficiaries of regulation
(usually individuals or communities) than to objects of regulation (usually
352 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003); Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947-48
(9th Cir. 2002); Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir.
2000) (en banc).
7. NRDC 1, 440 F.3d at 484 (quoting Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228,
1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
8. Id. at 483 (quoting Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
9. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (Public Citizen 1), 489 F.3d 1279, 1297
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added), supplemented by Public Citizen, Inc. v. Nat'l Highway Traffic
Safety Admin. (Public Citizen 11), 513 F3d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam). As these quotes make
clear, there are actually two quantities involved here: the background risk (which could be large or
small), and the increase in risk due to the challenged agency action (which could be small even if the
underlying risk is large). For simplicity, this Article treats these two quantities as identical, as the
argument applies equally well whether the background risk itself is small, or the background risk is
large but the increase due to the challenged rule is small.
10. See, e.g., NRDC 1/, 464 F.3d at 7 (noting that "[t]he lifetime risk that an individual will develop
nonfatal skin cancer as a result of EPA's rule is about... 1 in 129,000" according to the EPA).
11. See, e.g., Kennecott Greens Creek Mining Co. v. Mine Safety and Health Admin., 476 F.3d 946,
954-55 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that the court "will give an extreme degree of deference to the agency
when it is evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise").
12. See NRDC 1, 440 F.3d at 481-82 nn.8, 9.
13. See Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d at 1295.
14. See Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and
Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1203, 1216 (2002).
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business interests).15 But even if one accepts the premise that the Take Care
Clause 6 and case-or-controversy requirement of Articles II and 11, respec-
tively, limit courts' jurisdiction to hear increased-risk suits alleging agency
misinterpretation or under-enforcement of the law, the D.C. Circuit standing
threshold offers no assistance in identifying the appropriate limits. On the
contrary, the threshold obscures the real issues raised by increased-risk claims-
and does so without theoretical justification. Moreover, the threshold trivializes
true (if sometimes tiny) injuries; imposes a formidable, judicially created tax on
citizen suits; subverts legislative priorities; and creates a superficially objective
shield behind which courts can hide inherently "malleable" and "value-laden"
17
evaluations of injury.
To explore these flaws, this Article considers the D.C. Circuit standing
threshold's historical context, theoretical foundation, practical effect, and impli-
cations for separation of powers. Part I provides a brief history of the develop-
ment of standing jurisprudence, focusing on the recent Supreme Court cases
that have begun to explicate constitutional limits on the types of injury-in-fact
sufficient to support standing. Part II turns from doctrinal history to analysis,
considering and rejecting the most obvious theoretical justification for a stand-
ing threshold in increased-risk cases: that tiny risks are somehow not (or not
sufficiently) injurious.
Part IH examines the practical effects of the D.C. Circuit threshold on
increased-risk cases, on plaintiffs, and on agency policy implementation. As
these effects make clear, the threshold is far too blunt an instrument to distin-
15. See, e.g., RPcHARD J. LAzARus, THE MAYiNG OF ENvmOramErAL LAW 82, 133-34 (2004) (dis-
cussing standing history); William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests
and Article III Standing Analysis After Bennett v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 763, 766 (1997) (observing
that, after Bennett, the "standing inquiry playing field... is tilted to the advantage of regulatory
targets"); Evan Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 Sup. CT. REv.
199, 226 (characterizing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife's standing holding as perhaps "an attempted
end-run around the Court's rejection of [Justice Scalia's] extreme unitarian position in Morrison v.
Olson"); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988) (arguing that the
only constitutional standing requirement is and should be a legal cause of action); Lisa Heinzerling, The
Commercial Constitution, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 217, 268-69 (contrasting standing in Commerce Clause
and other regulatory challenges and concluding that "the Court's concepts of discrimination and
regulation suggest a return to Lochner-style assumptions about the natural and proper role of govern-
ment"); Gene R. Nichol, Forward: The Impossibility of Lujans Project, 11 DuKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F.
193, 196 (2001) ("Lujan, in full flower, would strike at congressionally authorized standing and the
claimed 'overjudicialization' of the operation of American government."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DuKE LJ.
1170 (1993) (characterizing Lujan as "an insupportable judicial contraction of the legislative power to
make judicially enforceable policy decisions"); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of
Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MicH. L. REV. 163, 169-70 (1992) (questioning the
constitutional necessity for a fact-based standing inquiry); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing
and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STrN. L. Rav. 1371, 1374 (1988) ("[T]he modem doctrine of
standing is a distinctly twentieth century product that was fashioned out of other doctrinal materials
largely through the conscious efforts of Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter.").
16. U.S. CoNsT. art. HI, § 3 ("[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.").
17. Nichol, supra note 15, at 199.
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guish increased-risk claims worthy of review from those better left to agency
discretion-particularly given the numerous, more finely-honed analytic tools
that courts have at their disposal. Finally, Part IV argues that fixing the
threshold's logical failings would not address the fundamental issue-namely,
that legislators are better suited than judges to decide whether imposition of a
tiny risk should be a legally cognizable injury and that agencies are better
equipped than courts to perform quantitative risk assessments.
I. THE APPARITION OF STANDING LAW
The "irreducible constitutional minimum" requirement for standing is famil-
iar to most lawyers: The plaintiff must allege an "'injury in fact' . ... 'fairly
traceable' to the actions of the defendant, and.., likely [to] be redressed by a
favorable decision." 8 Less familiar, perhaps, is the history of that requirement.
Until about 100 years ago, courts concerned themselves less with detailed
factual questions about the nature and scale of the harm to the plaintiff than
with "whether Congress or any other source of law had granted the plaintiff a
right to sue. To have standing, a litigant needed a legal right to bring suit"-in
.short, a cause of action. 
19
A. STANDING PAST
How, then, did standing law develop into its current "confusing," and at times
"seemingly incoherent ' 20 form? According to many scholars, the doctrine devel-
oped in tandem with-and largely as a reaction to-the growth of the federal
administrative state. 21 "As private entities increasingly came to be controlled by
statutory and regulatory. duties, as government increasingly came to be con-
trolled by statutory and constitutional commands, and as individuals sought to
control the greatly augmented power of the government through the judicial
process," citizen plaintiffs increasingly called on courts "to articulate and
enforce public.., values."22 Courts, in turn, struggled to identify appropriate
limits for the growing array of lawsuits in which plaintiffs sought, in general
terms, to enforce agencies' statutory duties. Eventually, the requirement that a
plaintiff establish an individualized "injury in fact" emerged as one such limit.
23
On first consideration, the requirement of individuated injury-in-fact may
18. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555,560-61 (1992)).
19. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 170; see also Fletcher, supra note 15, at 225 (describing the same
history); Winter, supra note 15, at 1372-73).
20. Winter, supra note 15, at 1372.
21. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 15, at 225; Gene R. Nichol, Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law
Litigation, 42 DuKE LJ. 1141 (1993); Sunstein, supra note 15, at 179-81; Winter, supra note 15, at 1453.
22. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 225.
23. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). For the argument
that the present, fact-based standing inquiry has constitutional rather than pragmatic roots, see, for
example, Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative Writs: The Original Understand-
ing, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1001 (1997); John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42
20091
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seem a straightforward answer to the "difficult question" of "who [may] sue to
enforce the legal duties of an agency"2 4 : Only plaintiffs who have suffered at
the hands of the agency may sue; third parties with philosophical bones to pick
may not. The problem, of course, is how to define individuated injury-and therein
lies much of the complexity and contentiousness of the current standing debate.
The Supreme Court first attempted to delimit justiciable injury in the 1930s
and 1940s-at the end of the era of substantive due process, when libertarian
Justices sought other ways to curtail the power of progressive New Deal
agencies.2 5 In response to this line of attack, "Justices like Brandeis and
Frankfurter... develop[ed] doctrines of jurisdictional limitation," deliberately
adopting a private rights framework to "preclude any dissatisfied private citizen
from invoking the Constitution in the courts to challenge the progressive
programs enacted by the polity.
26
In the private rights framework, true harms that do not violate a legal
right-a right "of property, ... arising out of contract.... protected against
tortious invasion, or... founded on a statute which confers a privilege"-are
"danum absque injuria, and will not support a cause of action or a right to
sue." 27 The resulting cases "protect[ed] the legislative sphere from judicial
interference" 28 by curtailing taxpayers' and business interests' standing to chal-
lenge agencies' spending programs and participation in private markets.29 In so
doing, these early-twentieth-century cases confirmed that some harms are not
justiciable because they do not amount to "legal injury."
These cases said nothing, however, about the extent of Congress's authority
DUKE L.J. 1219, 1220 (1993); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881,894-95 (1983).
24. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 225.
25. See Winter, supra note 15, at 1454-55.
26. Id. at 1456-57.
27. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137, 140 (1939).
28. Winter, supra note 15, at 1457.
29. In Fairchild v. Hughes, for example, a citizen taxpayer plaintiff challenged the ratification
process for the Nineteenth Amendment and asked the Court to "restrain the Secretary of State from
issuing any proclamation declaring that it has been ratified; and... [to restrain] the Attorney General
... from enforcing it." Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 127 (1922). The Court dismissed the suit
because the plaintiff lacked an enforceable private right:
Plaintiff has only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the government be
administered according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted. Obviously this
general right does not entitle a private citizen to institute in the federal courts a suit to
secure.., a determination whether a statute, if passed, or a constitutional amendment, about
to be adopted, will be valid.
Id. at 129-30.
Along related lines, in Tennessee Electric, the appellant electricity companies objected to competi-
tion from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) on the ground that Congress could not constitutionally
grant TVA the power to generate and sell electricity because such power lies outside Congress's
authority "to improve navigation and control floods in the navigable waters of the nation." Tenn. Elec.,
306 U.S. at 135-36. The Court held the hann to appellants nonjusticiable because "the damage
consequent on competition, otherwise lawful,... will not support a cause of action or a right to sue."
Id. at 140.
[Vol. 97:391
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to expand the legal injury category, in particular by crafting citizen-suit provi-
sions that expressly recognize the harm done to beneficiaries of a regulatory
regime when the implementing agency misapprehends, under-enforces, or other-
wise violates the law. This issue of congressional authority to (re)define justi-
ciable injury came to a head toward the end of the twentieth century. In the
previous decades, Congress had passed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
and numerous public health and environmental statutes that, together, purported
to grant citizens the right to sue agency "administrators [for] failing to enforce
the law as Congress required., 30 Through the early 1970s, though, courts'
justiciability inquiries still placed emphasis on the existence of a "legal injury,"
albeit now an injury either to a protected common law interest or to an interest
newly recognized by statute. The resulting legal regime responded well to
then-current research suggesting that "agencies were sometimes subject to
sustained political pressure from regulated industries."'" Permissive standing
decisions allowed citizens to enlist the courts in their efforts to force "captured"
agencies to toe the statutory line.3 2
Even as the Court was issuing these decisions, however, the standing land-
scape was beginning to shift in ways that would have significant repercussions
for citizen standing. Of particular note is a 1970 Supreme Court decision that
many read as expanding citizen standing,33 Association of Data Processing
Organizations v. Camp.34 In Camp, the Court found standing for the petitioners,
who sought equitable relief against the Comptroller of the Currency for allow-
ing national banks to horn in on the petitioners' data processing business.35 In
30. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 184, 193.
31. See id. at 183-84.
32. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 US. 727 (1972). In Sierra Club, the Court denied Sierra Club's standing because the group
had failed to allege that the challenged development of a national forest would harm the club in any
way. 405 U.S. at 735. Importantly, though, the Court made clear that the Club would have standing to
sue on behalf of members who used the area, and "for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the
area [would] be lessened by" the challenged development. Id. In SCRAP, the Court found standing for
plaintiffs who made the rather attenuated argument that a rail-fare increase would increase pollution by
making recycling more costly. 412 U.S. at 686, 687-88. In Duke Power, the Court permitted organiza-
tions and individuals to challenge the constitutionality of the Price Anderson Act, which, they alleged,
made possible Duke Power's construction of nuclear power plants in North and South Carolina. 438
U.S. at 67, 81-82. These and other 1970s cases established that "citizen allegations of [ecological
injury] could satisfy" at least the first, injury-in-fact prong of the standing inquiry, despite "the
exceedingly attenuated and speculative allegations of causation" present in some cases. Lazarus, supra
note 15, at 82, 134.
33. See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-39 (1976) ("In Data Processing
Service v. Camp, this Court held the constitutional standing requirement under [the APA] to be
allegations which, if true, would establish that the plaintiff had been injured in fact by the action he
sought to have reviewed. Reduction of the threshold requirement to actual injury redressable by the
court represented a substantial broadening of access to the federal courts over that previously thought to
be the constitutional minimum under this statute." (internal citation omitted)).
34. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
35. Id. at 151, 158.
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so doing, however, the Court recharacterized the standing inquiry, describing
the "'legal interest' test" as "go[ing] to the merits ' 36 and identifying a novel
alternative-a fact-based, two-step standing inquiry.37 According to Camp, that
inquiry asks first "whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has
caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise," and only second (and
prudentially, rather than as a matter of constitutional necessity) "whether the
interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
,,38 'r~ squestion. That is, the Camp Court redirected the constitutional inquiry from
the text of the applicable statute to the facts of the particular case and shifted
consideration of the relevant statutory review provisions to a secondary, pruden-
tial "zone of interests" test.
39
The Camp Court may not have anticipated the jurisdiction-limiting potential
of its shift from a standing requirement based on legal injury to one based on
individualized injury-in-fact. After all, the Court found standing for the petition-
ers and did so after quoting Flast v. Cohen4° for the proposition that "the
question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be
adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
' ,iewed as capable of judicial resolution."'4 That is, Camp implies that if a
factual injury exists, there is constitutional standing, whatever the merits of the
plaintiff's legal claim. Finally, the times were such that Justice Douglas could
assert that "[w]here statutes are concerned, the trend is toward enlargement of
the class of people who may protest administrative action."42 In short, the
context and language of the opinion suggest that the Court viewed itself as
expanding the range of cases and controversies that courts could entertain.
As things played out, however, Camp had the opposite effect, 43 for two
contrary reasons. First, the Camp Court's expansive description of the "zone of
interests" test worried those (including then-Judge Antonin Scalia) who ques-
tion the role of citizen attorneys general in promoting agency enforcement of
the laws.44 At the same time, Camp's refocusing of the constitutional inquiry
gave those opponents a hook on which to hang a novel and highly restrictive
standing theory. In a widely quoted 1983 essay, Scalia developed the idea:
36. Id. at 53.
37. See id. at 152-53; Sunstein, supra note 15, at 184-86.
38. Camp, 397 U.S. at 152-53.
39. See id. at 153.
40. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
41. Camp, 397 U.S. at 151-52 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 101) (emphasis added). Flast expanded
taxpayer standing, recognizing what the Court has since characterized as "a narrow exception to the
general rule against federal taxpayer standing" for plaintiffs challenging "a law authorizing the use of
federal funds in a way that allegedly violates the Establishment Clause." Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Found., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007).
42. Camp, 397 U.S. at 155.
43. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 164-65 (describing the narrow law of standing advocated by Justice
Scalia and adopted by the Court when dealing with a congressional grant of standing to citizens).
44. Scalia, supra note 23, at 888-89 (critiquing Camp).
[Vol. 97:391
THE DANGERS OF IMPOSING A STANDING THRESHOLD
[Tihe law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic
role of protecting individuals and minorities "against impositions of the major-
ity, and excludes them from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing
how the other two branches should function ....
... [Consider] the increasingly frequent administrative law cases in which
the plaintiff is complaining of an agency's unlawful failure to impose a
requirement or prohibition upon someone else. Such a failure harms the
plaintiff, by depriving him, as a citizen, of governmental acts which the Con-
stitution and laws require. But that harm alone is... a majoritarian one. The
plaintiff may care more about it .... But that does not establish that he has
been harmed distinctively .... Unless the plaintiff can show some respect in
which he is harmed more than the rest of us... he has not established any
basis for concern that the majority is suppressing or ignoring the rights of a
minority that wants protection, and thus has not established the prerequisite
for judicial intervention.
That explains ... why "concrete injury "--an injury apart from the... very fact
of unlawful government action-is the indispensable prerequisite of standing.45
Moreover, Scalia continued, "not all 'concrete injury' ... [is] capable of
supporting a congressional conferral of standing"; some injuries are too "widely
shared" to "mark out a subgroup of the body politic requiring judicial protec-
tion.",46 In other words, if a plaintiff complains only that an agency failed to
follow a legislative mandate that was enacted to protect her and many others,
she lacks the individuated injury that is a constitutional prerequisite to suit, even
if she can point to a statutory provision that clearly grants her a cause of action.
Less than a decade after then-Judge Scalia articulated this standing theory,
Justice Scalia "talked his colleagues into following his lead" in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife.4 7 With Lujan, the Court completed the transformation of
standing doctrine from a comparatively straightforward examination of causes
of action into an abstruse inquiry into injuries-in-fact. Plaintiffs in the case
challenged a Department of Interior rule that adopted a restrictive reading of the
Endangered Species Act.48 To establish standing, the plaintiffs cited the Act's
expansive citizen-suit provision,49 but they failed to introduce evidence that
satisfactorily distinguished them from "anyone who observes or works with an
endangered species, anywhere in the world." 50 That is, the Lujan plaintiffs
45. Id. at 894-95 (final emphasis added).
46. Id. at 895-96.
47. Nichol, supra note 15, at 194. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
48. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558-59.
49. See id. at 571-72. This provision purports to allow "any person" to "commence a civil suit on his
own behalf... to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumen-
tality or agency.., alleged to be in violation of any provision" of the Act. Endangered Species Act of
1973 § 11, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000).
50. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 567.
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claimed just the sort of "widely shared" injury that Scalia had argued nine years
earlier cannot "support[] a congressional conferral of standing."'', The results
were dire: The Court not only disputed the plaintiffs' claimed injury but also
held, for the first time, that statutory grants of comprehensive jurisdiction over
citizen suits brought to ensure "executive officers' compliance with the law"
may violate the case-or-controversy requirement and encroach on the Presi-
dent's responsibility "to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."' 52
Importantly, though, Justices Kennedy and Souter emphasized (in a partial
concurrence authored by Justice Kennedy) that in their view Congress does
have the authority "to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before," provided that the
relevant statute both identifies "the injury [Congress] seeks to vindicate" and
ties that injury "to the class of persons entitled to bring suit."
53
Commentators immediately recognized Lujan as an important case and specu-
lated about its implications.54 Clearly, the holding "foreclose[d] 'pure' citizen
suits," in which someone "with an ideological or law-enforcement interest
initiates a proceeding against the government, seeking to require an agency to
undertake action of the sort required by law.",55 Together, Article III and the
Take Care Clause bar such a suit, no matter how sweeping the language of the
applicable statutory cause of action. But how much farther would the Court
extend its condemnation of widely shared injuries? What of cases in which an
individual with a health-related interest in, say, abatement of air pollution seeks
to hold the Environmental Protection Agency's feet to the fire? Must she
establish that her concern about pollution exceeds the general public's concern?
Is it enough if she is an asthmatic, or must she also claim to live or work near a
regulated smokestack? And finally, of particular importance here, may she
assert that she faces a small increased risk of asthma attacks, or must she either
establish that her increased risk is substantial or wait to sue until she has
experienced shortness of breath due to the challenged agency action? As one
commentator put it, the "sentiment" that "[c]laims based on the public interest
... are political disputes, not lawsuits.., began to look like law in Lujan";
56
the question that remained was how many claims the Court would ultimately
place in the "political disputes" category.
B. STANDING PRESENT
Between 1992 and the present, the Court largely allayed concerns that it
would expand on the ideas in the Lujan majority opinion by defining the
injury-in-fact concept so narrowly as to bar Congress from relying on citizen
51. Scalia, supra note 23, at 895.
52. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. H, § 3).
53. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
54. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 15, at 1188-95 (speculating about the "potential effects of [Lujan]").
55. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 226.
56. Nichol, supra note 15, at 195.
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attorneys general to ensure enforcement of the nation's environmental and
public health and welfare laws. In Federal Election Commission v. Akins, for
example, six members of the Court found standing for plaintiffs who challenged
the Commission's failure to enforce certain disclosure.provisions of the election
laws against the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. 57 The Court ex-
plained that the resulting informational injury, though "widely shared," was
neither "abstract" nor "indefinite"; the injury was "directly related to voting, the
most basic of political rights," and was "sufficiently concrete and specific such
that the fact that it [was] widely shared [did] not deprive Congress of constitu-
tional power to authorize its vindication in the federal courts. '58 Under Akins,
then, Congress may continue to authorize citizen suits to vindicate "concrete"
and "specific" public interests; Lujan's strictures extend only to "abstract...
harm[s]-for example, injury [solely] to the interest in seeing that the law is
obeyed."'5 9
Two years later, in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, a
slightly larger majority of the Court further confirmed the vitality of this sort of
public litigation. 60 The Laidlaw plaintiffs filed a citizen suit against the owner
of a wastewater treatment facility that had violated its obligations under a Clean
Water Act discharge permit. The Court held that to establish standing, the
plaintiff organizations did not have to demonstrate that discharges from the
facility had harmed the river or its environs. Rather, the organizations could
represent members who lived, worked, or recreated near the facility, and who
asserted that the discharges, and "reasonable concerns about the effects of those
discharges, directly affected [the members'] recreational, aesthetic, and eco-
nomic interests. 61
Laidlaw did not concern injuries as universal as those at issue in Lujan and
Akins. In the former case, the injured members of the plaintiff organizations had
all spent significant time within a few miles of the affected river-they were, in
Scalia's words, "harmed distinctively., 62 That said, one can frame many environ-
mental harms as a threat to some individual's use and enjoyment of some
environmental resource. In theory, then, Laidlaw further limited the potential
ramifications of Lujan; as long as a plaintiff wishing to challenge agency
inaction can identify harm to her distinct "recreational, aesthetic, and economic
interests, 63 her claim no longer bears the hallmarks of a constitutionally
suspect "'pure' citizen suit[]." 64
57. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 15-16, 28 (1998). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens,
Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer's opinion; Justices O'Connor and Thomas joined
Justice Scalia's dissent. Id. at 13.
58. Id. at 24-25.
59. Id. at 24.
60. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180-88 (2000).
.61. Id. at 183-84.
62. Scalia, supra note 23, at 895.
63. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184.
64. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 226.
2009]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
Finally, no history of standing is complete without mention of the Court's
recent opinion in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency. 65 This
victory for environmental plaintiffs established EPA's authority under the Clean
Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles.66 To reach the
merits issue, however, the Court had to satisfy itself that the plaintiffs' climate
change concerns-"widely held" almost by definition-constituted sufficiently
concrete and specific injury to support the Clean Air Act's grant of standing.67
Although the majority found standing in Massachusetts, several aspects of
the opinion suggest an uncertain future for citizen attorneys general pressing
claims based on injuries that are widely shared. First, only five Justices signed
the Massachusetts opinion. In some contrast to the Rehnquist Court, which
mustered a six-member majority for Akins, the newly constituted Roberts Court
includes four members who readily agree that redress of widely held griev-
ances, such as concern about the present and future effects of climate change,
"'is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive,' not the federal courts."68
Moreover, Justice Stevens' carefully worded opinion for the remaining five
Justices leaves some doubt as to their collective willingness to affirm a role for
courts in addressing such claims. Specifically, Stevens' discussion of the "con-
crete" nature of the plaintiffs' injury69 focuses entirely on property loss to a
state rather than an individual, as a result of historic rather than future sea level
rise.
According to petitioners' unchallenged affidavits, global sea levels rose some-
where between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th century as a result of
global warming. These rising seas have already begun to swallow Massachu-
setts' coastal land. Because the Commonwealth owns a substantial portion of
the state's coastal property, it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity
as a landowner. The severity of that injury will only increase over-the course
of the next century .... 70
That is, nothing in the Massachusetts opinion suggests that standing premised
on a widely shared risk of future (rather than past or present) harm to individu-
als (rather than sovereign States) would satisfy all five Justices who signed that
opinion. But for its actual holding, therefore, the opinion portends a dubious
future for individuals' standing to assert injury due to agency dereliction on a
pending problem of broad public significance. 7'
65. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
66. Id. at 1462.
67. See id. at 1453.
68. Id. at 1464 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576
(1992)).
69. See id. at 1455-56 (majority opinion).
70. Id. at 1456 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
71. The Massachusetts Court does quote favorably from SCRAP, the Supreme Court's most permis-
sive (and most widely discredited) standing opinion: "To deny standing to persons who are in fact
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C. STANDING YET TO COME
Enter the D.C. Circuit. The circuit's requirement that plaintiffs facing a
widely shared risk of future injury must demonstrate the substantiality of that
risk before they may challenge the causative agency action derives from the
same separation of powers concerns expressed in Lujan (and in the dissents in
Akins, Laidlaw, and Massachusetts). Specifically, as the court explained in a
preliminary decision in Public Citizen, Inc. v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, the standing threshold aims to ensure that courts do not over-
step their constitutional role:
The consequences of allowing standing in... increased-risk cases are perhaps
obvious, but worth explicating. Much government regulation slightly in-
creases a citizen's risk of injury-or insufficiently decreases the risk com-
pared to what some citizens might prefer.... [If courts were to hear all
probabilistic injury claims, then] after an agency takes virtually any action,
virtually any citizen-because of a fractional chance of benefit from alterna-
tive action-would have standing to obtain judicial review of the agency's
choice. Opening the courthouse [in this way] ... would expand the "proper-
and properly limited"-constitutional role of the Judicial Branch beyond
deciding actual cases or controversies; and would entail the Judiciary exercis-
ing some part of the Executive's responsibility to take care that the law be
faithfully executed.72
In other words, in the D.C. Circuit's view, the sheer number of potential
increased-risk claims creates a constitutional dilemma. Hearing all such claims
would turn courts into a sort of democratically unaccountable fiber-agency, so
judges must find some way to separate the wheat from the chaff.
What is remarkable about the D.C. Circuit's approach is that it goes consider-
ably further than the Lujan majority did in limiting Congress's power "to define
injuries.., that will give rise to a case or controversy., 73 As noted above, two
of the six Justices who signed the majority opinion in Lujan recognized only
two qualifications on congressional authority to identify new, legally cognizable
injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and
widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion." Id.
at 1458 n.24 (quoting SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). To
establish Massachusetts' standing, however, the Court relies on the state's historic loss of coastline
rather than any risk of future injury, suggesting that the majority's refusal to "accept that conclusion"
extends only to widespread government actions that have already taken a toll, not to widespread
government actions that merely impose risks.
72. Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted) (ordering
supplemental briefing on plaintiff's standing). Ultimately, after Public Citizen submitted a supplemental
brief and more than 200 pages of additional declarations supporting standing, the court determined that
the group had "not met its burden to demonstrate injury in fact." Public Citizen H, 513 F.3d 234, 241
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curium).
73. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
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injuries: To grant citizen standing, legislators must specify the injuries they aim
to address and the relationship between those injuries and the class of citizens
who may sue.7 4 The D.C. Circuit approach is far more limiting-no matter how
specific and carefully drafted the statute, legislators may not grant standing to
individuals who face only a tiny increase in risk of harm.
This outcome is sufficiently novel and important that it is worth restating.
Read together, the Lujan majority and concurring opinions place a constitu-
tional burden on legislators. By contrast, the D.C. Circuit's substantiality-of-the-
risk standing threshold places a constitutional limit on legislative authority.
To date, this standing threshold is peculiar to the D.C. Circuit. Other circuits
"have suggested that an increase in probability [of harm] itself constitutes an
'actual or imminent' injury" sufficient to support constitutional standing. 75 That
other circuits take a different approach does not, however, render the D.C.
Circuit standing threshold unimportant. For one thing, as just noted, the thresh-
old represents the most far-reaching step in the longstanding effort to place
constitutional limits on congressional authority to grant.citizen standing. More-
over, the threshold creates a real and perhaps insurmountable obstacle for
the many citizen plaintiffs who have little choice but to file in the D.C.
Circuit.76 Finally, the present difference of opinion among the courts of ap-
peals makes eventual Supreme Court review likely, at which point the ra-
tionale behind the threshold may well appeal to that Court's recently expanded
cadre of standing skeptics.77 For the reasons explained below, though, the
74. Supra note 53 and accompanying text.
75. Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 6 (citing cases in the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits).
76. The D.C. Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over many administrative disputes and concurrent
jurisdiction over most others. For example, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to review regulations
promulgated under the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(a)(1) (2000), the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 1017, 33 U.S.C. § 2717(a) (2000), Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976 § 7006, 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1) (2000), and the Comprehensive Environmental Resource,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) (2000); national pollution
standards issued under the Clean Air Act of 1963 § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000); "actions
pertaining to the establishment of national primary drinking water regulations" under the Safe Drinking
Water Act of 1974 § 1448, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(a)(1) (2000); decisions of the "God Squad" under the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n) (2000); and national rules promulgated under
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 526, 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a) (2000). Under the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 10, on the other hand, "[a]ny person aggrieved by a final order
of the [National Labor Relations] Board may obtain review.., in any United States court of appeals in
the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such
person resides or transacts business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia." 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (2000) (emphasis added). Similarly, venue for review of any proceeding
under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 § 119 "shall be in the judicial circuit in which the
petitioner involved resides or has its principal office, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia." 42 U.S.C. § 10139 (2000). See also John G. Roberts, What Makes the D.C.
Circuit Different, 92 VA. L. Rav. 375, 389 (2006) ("Whatever combination of letters you can put
together, it is likely that jurisdiction to review that agency's decision is vested in the D.C. Circuit.").
77. Cf Susan Low Bloch & Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the Federal
Courts of the District of Columbia, 90 GEo. L.J. 549, 567-68, 576-77 & n.165 (2002) (noting
numerous cases in which the Supreme Court has adopted the D.C. Circuit's view on issues of substance
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threshold is neither a necessary nor a prudent solution to any separation of
powers problem.
II. THE INJURIOUSNESS OF SMALL RISKS IN THEORY
The first important criticism of the standing threshold is that there is no
coherent theoretical justification for limiting standing in increased-risk cases to
plaintiffs who face a "substantial" risk of future harm. That is, as explained
below, there is no valid theoretical reason to suppose that small risks are
non-injurious. Thus, if there is any justification for the threshold at all, it is not
to weed out cases that are in some sense inherently improper, but instead to
reduce the number of increased-risk cases, either to keep courts within their
"proper-and properly limited-role ... in a democratic society,' 78 or simply
to conserve judicial resources for cases involving more serious risks.
To prove this point, this section considers and rejects the two most plausible
theoretical justifications for the D.C. Circuit standing threshold: that dismissal
of cases involving 'insubstantial' risks is necessary either (A) to advance some
jurisprudential goal or (B) to adhere to some moral framework.
A. JURISPRUDENTIAL THEORY
To determine whether the D.C. Circuit standing threshold advances any of the
jurisprudential goals of the standing inquiry, one must first articulate those
goals. At the most general level, the inquiry prevents courts from overstepping
their constitutional bounds. As the Supreme Court put it in a recent decision:
"The standing requirement is born partly of 'an idea, which is more than an
intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and
prudential limitg to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our
kind of government.' ,,
79
In practice, those "constitutional and prudential" limits amount to a prohibi-
tion on advisory opinions and the need for a statutory or other legal "hook." 80 In
turn, the prohibition on advisory opinions necessitates "proper adversarial
presentation"-that is, both parties must "have an actual ... stake in the out-
come, and. . . the legal questions presented... [must] be resolved, not in the
rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context
or procedure). Of course, the D.C. Circuit's innovations do not always impress the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn's, 531 U.S. 457, 476 (2001) (rejecting the D.C. Circuit's
conclusion that the Clean Air Act's delegation of authority to EPA to set air pollution standards at a
level "requisite to protect public health" violated the nondelegation doctrine). But see Bloch &
Ginsburg, supra, at 577 (pointing out that even in those administrative law cases in which the Supreme
Court rejects the D.C. Circuit's view, the lower court's consideration of the issues often "elevate[s] the
[Supreme] Court's comprehension of the diverse considerations at stake").
78. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
79. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 750
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
80. See infra Part 1M1.
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conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action."'"
To mount a jurisprudential defense of the 'substantiality-of-the-risk standing
threshold, therefore, one must identify some difference between large and small
risks that aligns with this purpose-in other words, some characteristic of small
risks that reduces plaintiffs' "stake in the outcome" of their lawsuits.
The difficulty with such an argument is that in all other contexts, a violation
of legally protected interests is a cognizable injury however small the violation.
The Supreme Court made this very point in a passage of SCRAP that has thus
far escaped criticism:
The Government urges us to limit standing to those who have been "signifi-
cantly" affected by agency action. But... we think [such a test] fundamen-
tally misconceived. "Injury in fact"... serves to distinguish a person with a
direct stake in the outcome of a litigation-even though small-from a
person with a mere interest in the problem. We have allowed important
interests to be vindicated by plaintiffs with no more at stake in the outcome of
an action than a fraction of a vote, a $5 fine and costs, and a $1.50 poll tax. As
Professor Davis has put it: "he basic idea that comes out in numerous cases
is that an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of
principle ....82
Indeed, in the class action context, both the Federal Rules and the courts view
the small size of some real injuries as a hurdle for federal litigation to overcome
rather than a theoretical bar to jurisdiction.83 As the Supreme Court has stated,
"[t]he policy at the... core of [Rule 23's] class action mechanism is to over-
come the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. 8 4 The Seventh
Circuit made the same point in the context of a 17-million-member class action:
"The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17,000,000 individual suits, but
zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30. ",85 Concededly,
the named plaintiffs in class actions must individually demonstrate standing.86
81. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
82. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n. 14 (1973) (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and
Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 601, 613 (1968)) (internal citations omitted).
83. For a general discussion of "parallels between class action litigation and administrative regula-
tion," see Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 94-118
(2003).
84. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997)).
85. Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
86. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) ("That a suit may be a class
action... adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named pliintiffs who represent a class
'.must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other,
unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent."' (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975))).
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That is, they cannot rely on injuries to other members of the class to establish
their own standing. But that requirement ensures only that uninjured plaintiffs
do not seek to represent a class of injured people; it does not block class-action
suits by named plaintiffs who, individually, sustained only tiny injuries.87 The
lesson from these cases is that even tiny violations of individual rights deserve
vindication-when matters of principle are at stake, "an identifiable trifle is
enough."88
Lessons from tort law are only slightly more ambiguous. First, although few
courts permit a tort plaintiff to recover for increased risk absent a present
manifestation of illness, 89 courts impose this limitation primarily to achieve
efficient compensation and optimal deterrence 9°-concerns absent in administra-
tive increased-risk cases. Allowing some toxic tort victims to recover for risk
and the same or other victims to recover for manifest physical injury could
expose tortfeasors to liability in excess of the actual societal costs of their
conduct, creating an inefficient level of deterrence and exhausting the limited
resources available for compensation. 91 In administrative law, there is no such
problem: One suit is sufficient to determine the lawfulness of an agency action,
one remand sufficient to remedy any alleged defects.
In addition, in the few situations in which the availability of a tort remedy
turns on the size rather than the existence of an alleged risk, the issue is
generally recognized as one of causation and not-as in the D.C. Circuit
.standing threshold-one of injury-in-fact. Consider, for example, medical mal-
practice cases. Historically, courts required plaintiffs in such cases to demon-
strate that they had a greater than fifty percent chance of recovery but for the
malpractice.92 That is, courts refused to recognize a medical malpractice claim
premised on increased risk of death unless the plaintiff could demonstrate that
her ex ante risk of death was less than fifty percent. So, for example, relatives of
a woman who died of cancer could not sue her doctor alleging that his failure to
provide timely diagnosis and treatment reduced her chance of survival unless
87. See, e.g., Carnegie, 376 F.3d at 661-62.
88. See SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973) (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers
and Others, 35 U. CHn. L. REv. 601, 613 (1968)).
89. See, e.g., In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 361 F. Supp. 2d 268, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[W]here
bodily injury is at most latent and any eventual consequences uncertain, the case for allowing recovery
is weak." (internal quotations omitted) (citing Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp. v. Carter, 993 S.W.2d
88 (Tex. 1999))). But see, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 850-51 (3d Cir. 1990)
(recognizing a cause of action for medical monitoring in Pennsylvania law; also discussing other
jurisdictions' handling of claims for emotional distress and medical monitoring and collecting cases).
90. See, e.g., Rezulin, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 275 ("[Plolicy concerns weigh[] against compensating
[latent] injury because plaintiffs might compete against those with manifest diseases for the legal
system's limited resources.").
91. See id.
92. See Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L. J. 1353, 1363 (1981) ("Under the
traditional approach, .... loss of a not-better-than-even chance of recovering from,... cancer would not
be compensable because it did not appear more likely tha[n] not that the patient would have survived
with proper care.").
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they could show that she would have had a greater-than-even chance of survival
with timely intervention. At bottom, though, medical malpractice courts focused
on the size of the ex ante chance of survival in these cases to assure themselves
that the doctor's negligence probably (that is, more likely than not) caused the
plaintiff's injury,9 3 rather than out of some concern that the plaintiff had
suffered no injury in fact.
Moreover, the trend in these cases is away from risk thresholds. Courts today
thus commonly recognize claims for "loss of chance," awarding partial or full
recoveries to medical malpractice plaintiffs who do not meet the historic
ex-ante-chance-of-recovery threshold of fifty-one percent.94 Courts use various
methods to compute damages for loss of chance. 95 For example, under one
version of the doctrine, if the woman in the above example had a forty percent
chance of recovery before the missed diagnosis, and no chance of recovery once
treatment was delayed, the court would hold the doctor "liable for 40 percent of
the damages caused by the patient's death."9 6 In essence, though, all versions of
the lost-chance doctrine turn on a recognition that "loss of chance is better
understood as a description of the injury than as ... a surrogate for the causa-
tion element of a negligence claim." 97 That is, courts reviewing these claims
increasingly see the imposition of risk itself as a compensable injury, even if the
patient's prognosis was dire before the malpractice and the malpractice only
slightly increased the patient's risk.
Finally, even if there were some jurisprudential reason to treat tiny risks
differently in standing law than in class actions and tort suits, it would be
nonsensical to evaluate only the quantitative likelihood of the feared harm and
not the magnitude of that harm. The familiar economics term "expected value"
embodies this intuition. A one-in-a-million chance of winning money has no
clear value, but a one-in-a-million chance of winning $1 million or $1 billion
does-$1 or $1000, respectively. Similarly, it makes little sense to hold, as in
NRDC I, that a plaintiff is insufficiently injured if she faces only a tiny
numerical probability of harm. 9 8 To be internally coherent, a substantiality-of-the-
risk standing threshold would have to turn on the expected value of the
threatened harm; no other value gives any indication of the plaintiff's "actual
.. stake in the outcome" 99 of the case.
The D.C. Circuit standing threshold therefore does little to advance the
jurisprudential goal of true adversity. But what if one believes, as Justice Scalia
avowedly does, that standing serves to maintain courts' "traditional undemo-
93. See id. at 1363--64.
94. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 676 So. 2d 543, 547 n.8 (La. 1996) (noting that "the loss of a chance of
survival doctrine ... has been recognized by a majority of the states").
95. See id. at 547-48 (discussing the various methods).
96. David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605, 611 (2001).
97. Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 279 (Ind. 2000).
98. See NRDC 1, 440 F.3d 476,484 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
99. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007).
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cratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the
majority"? 1°° A threshold based on the size of the risk to the named plaintiff
does nothing to filter out cases involving injuries to a majority of the popula-
tion. A risk imposed by the majority on a minority may be large or small, just as
a risk imposed by the majority on itself, or by a minority on the majority.10 In
short, the size of the risk says nothing about the relative democratic strength of
the group suffering the risk. If the role of the standing inquiry is to reserve
questions of broad public import for resolution by the democratically elected
branches, then the filter should turn on the number of affected individuals rather
than the size of the effect on any one individual.
One jurisprudential possibility remains. Perhaps, as the quotation from Public
Citizen I suggests, 10 2 the D.C. Circuit's principal concern is that the sheer
number of increased-risk cases is itself constitutionally problematic because it
risks wholesale judicial intervention in the faithful execution of the laws. Even
if that concern is justified, though, it calls for a justiciability filter that somehow
culls "worthwhile" cases and leaves the remainder to agency discretion-that is,
a filter that operates accurately in practice. As discussed in Part III below, the
D.C. Circuit standing threshold fails this test.
B. MORAL THEORY
Moral-theory justifications for the standing threshold are equally unavailing.
The reason is intuitive. To establish such a justification, one would need to
identify a moral framework that called for courts to ignore cases in which
plaintiffs faced only a de minimis risk of harm. Yet intuition suggests that at
least in an ideal world-that is, absent resource and human limitations-there
would be no moral reason for society or courts to turn a blind eye to any risk, no
matter how tiny.
Professor Matthew Adler gives this intuition firm footing in a somewhat
different context-the statutory and regulatory "de minimis criteria [that] are a
widespread feature of U.S. risk regulation," including "cut-offs for incremental
individual cancer risk," "extreme event cutoffs in natural hazards policymak-
ing," and "de minimis failure probabilities for built structures."10 3 Applying
both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist *moral views, Adler concludes
that these de minimis criteria are "difficult to justify" as a matter of ideal moral
100. Scalia, supra note 23, at 894.
101. For example, the significant risks associated with inhaling air pollutants are imposed by a
minority (owners and operators of industrial facilities) on the majority (everyone who lives in
reasonable proximity to such a facility). See, e.g., Luis Cifuentes et al., Climate Change: Hidden Health
Benefits of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation, 293 SCMNCE 1257, 1257 (2001) ("It has been estimated that
reducing emissions from older coal-fired power plants in the United States could provide substantial
benefits to public health, including the avoidance of 18,700 deaths, 3 million lost work days, and 16
million restricted-activity days each year.").
102. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
103. Matthew D. Adler, Why De Minimis? 1 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Paper No. 164, 2007); available
at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1168&context=upenn/wps.
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theory. 104
Adler's point is a simple one. If one assumes perfectly rational policymakers
with the ability to analyze an infinite array of potential outcomes from any
given policy choice, there is no moral justification for legislation that mandates
the design of risk-reduction programs that stop just shy of complete protection.
A perfectly rational policymaker, with infinite time and cognitive capacity and
without biases, should be able (1) to evaluate all possible consequences of a
given policy choice and (2) to decide which choice yields the best results
(including all tradeoffs) in the governing moral frame. In this ideal world, then,
there would be no reason to place artificial legislative or regulatory limits on the
policymaker's choices by telling her to neglect outcomes whose risks fall below
some specified threshold. The policymaker might choose to neglect certain risks
in her policy choice (that is, she might decide, using cost-benefit analysis or
some other decision guide, that the advantages of a particular policy choice
outweigh its risks), but there is no reason to direct her to neglect those risks in
her policy analysis.
Though Adler develops his thesis in the context of legislative and regulatory
de minimis thresholds, the conclusion has direct application in the standing
context. Specifically, in ideal theory, all risks are morally relevant. There is no
rationale grounded in moral theory for concluding that small risks are non-
injurious,
What happens, though, when one relaxes the assumption of perfect decision-
makers unconstrained by resource limitations? Adler observes that there may
indeed be a practical role for de minimis criteria in a world of real policymakers
with biases and cognitive limitations because such criteria permit policymakers
to "economize on decision costs" by neglecting minimally risky (or minimally
probable) outcomes.1 0 5 By analogy, there may be a corresponding role for de
minimis criteria in justiciability inquiries-but that role, if it exists at all, is
solely to allow judges to economize on decision costs by conserving judicial
resources for cases of greater import in the relevant moral frame.
Thus, both jurisprudential and moral theory lead to a single conclusion: There
is no pure-theory justification for a substantiality-of-the-risk standing threshold.
Such a threshold might serve jurisprudential- or moral-theory goals by permit-
ting judges to dispose of frivolous cases, but only if the threshold successfully
identifies cases that are, in some sense, more "worthy of review."
104. Id. at 3.
105. See id. at 26. According to Adler, however, it is by no means clear "[wihich [de minimis] tests
... a boundedly rational decisionmaker [is] morally justified in employing ... given the presence and
level of decision costs, and ... the tests' relative(] accuracy in mimicking what a fuller social welfare
analysis would conclude." Id. at 28. In other words, even in a real world of imperfect regulators, moral
theory offers no clear justification for legislative imposition of any particular de minimis risk threshold.
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Hf. THE INJURIOUSNESS OF SMALL RISKS IN PRACTICE
The next question, then, is whether the D.C. Circuit standing threshold serves
this practical purpose of culling worthwhile increased-risk cases, and thereby
conserving judicial resources and protecting the "'proper-and properly lim-
ited'---constitutional role of the Judicial Branch." 10 6 This question has a two-
part answer.
A. A DULL KNIFE
The first part of the answer to the "practical effects" question is no. Quite the
contrary, the D.C. Circuit's standing threshold routinely fails to identify cases
that merit judicial review, for at least five reasons.
First, as noted above, the threshold focuses solely on the size of the risk to the
plaintiff and ignores the nature and magnitude of the feared harm. 10 7 Again, this
approach ignores the central lesson of expected value: the value of an opportu-
nity (or risk) is the product of both its likelihood and its value (or cost) if
realized. Ignoring this lesson makes little sense for a lottery, but it is even less
sensible in the context of public health and environmental risks because the
anticipated harm is often irreversible injury to the health of an individual or
ecosystem. Such harms are notoriously difficult-some would say impos-
sible-to monetize, 10 8 but the solution is not to pretend they are valueless, as
,the D.C. Circuit standing threshold effectively does. A plaintiff who faces a
1:1000 probability of getting sunburned may or may not have a sufficient stake
in the outcome of a lawsuit challenging the underlying agency action, but a
plaintiff who faces a much smaller probability of developing melanoma surely
does. 109
Second, the threshold focuses narrowly on the risk to the plaintiffs rather than
to the exposed population-that is, the "individual risk" rather than the "popula-
tion risk."" 0 One can make this critique of risk assessment more generally,"'
but it is just as valid a critique in the jurisprudential context as in policymaking.
Behaviors or policies that impose significant societal costs frequently have only
a tiny effect on each individual victim. For example, an employer who allegedly
106. Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1860 (2006)).
107. See supra text accompanying note 99.
108. See generally Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1557-60 (2003) (detailing the problems with
monetizing environmental and .public health benefits, and with figuring out how to express future
benefits in today's dollars).
109. Of course, some also argue that being at risk is itself an injury: See, e.g., Claire Finkelstein, Is
Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 963, 965 (2003) (arguing for "the existence of risk harm"). If one
accepts this view, then the "expected value" of the risk is not just the likelihood of illness multiplied by
the cost of illness but that quantity augmented by some measure of the cost of risk.
110. See Matthew D. Adler, Against "Individual Risk": A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1126 (2005).
111. See, e.g., id.
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violates the Fair Labor Standards Act by refusing to compensate employees for
the few minutes spent changing into protective gear at the start of each workday
may significantly pad its own pockets while depriving each employee of only a
few cents per day.1 12 In such situations, the extent of the harm to the named
individual plaintiff-employee (a few dollars a year) is a wholly inadequate
proxy for the importance of the underlying legal question (the legality of the
employer's company-wide compensation policy). As the Supreme Court has
noted, "modem class action practice emerged," in part, to address cases like
this, "where the question is of general interest, and a few may sue for the benefit
of the whole."
' 1 3
In cases involving statistical injury, the proxy problem is even more acute
because those who file suit represent not only the whole, but also the as-yet-
unidentified few who will ultimately bear the full cost of the alleged miscon-
duct. 114 Thus, a court that looks only at the present risk to the plaintiffs is
ignoring two additional variables: the size of the affected population and the
size of the anticipated harm.
Suppose, for example, that the nation's largest electric company, Florida
Power and Light (FPL), were simultaneously:
(1) Defrauding each of its approximately 4.5 million residential customers" 15
of a penny a year (total loss $38,000 per year);
(2) Emitting water pollutants that exposed those same customers to an annual
1:1,000,000 risk of contracting a disease that costs $10,000 to cure. (total
expected loss $38,000 per year); and
(3) Emitting air pollutants that exposed those customers to an annual
1:10,000,000 risk of contracting an incurable disease that statisticians estimate
112. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 24 (2005).
113. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832-33 (1999) (quoting West v. Randall, 29 F.
Cas. 718, 722 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820)).
114. One should not be misled by the fact that, at the time an increased-risk case is filed, the risk has
not yet been realized. The magnitude of a risk does not have to be large relative to the size of the
group-at-risk in order for there to be a greater than fifty-percent likelihood that at least one member of
that group will eventually suffer the anticipated harm. The following table illustrates this fact for a
cancer risk of 1:10,000.
Probability of Probability of Expected
Size of No Cancers at Least Number of
Group in Group One Cancer Cancers
100 0.99 0.00995 0.01
1000 0.905 0.095 0.1
10,000 0.37 0.63 1
100,000 4.54E-05 0.999955 10
1,000,000 Essentially 0 Essentially 1 100
10,000,000 Essentially 0 Essentially 1 1000
115. See FPL About Us, http://www.fplgroup.com/about/contents/fpl.shtml (last visited Aug. 18,
2008).
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reduces quality of life by $100,000 (total expected loss $38,000 per year).11 6
Further suppose that three plaintiff groups sue the company, one seeking
reimbursement for the fraud, one seeking to force the company to halt the fluid
discharges, and one seeking an injunction to require installation of smokestack
scrubbers. The individual plaintiffs' present interest in each case is the same-
$0.01 per year of fraud losses or risk exposure. And the overall value of each
case is also the same--$38,000 per year of misconduct.1 17 But in the risk cases,
one can expect a few plaintiffs to get sick.118 If those plaintiffs could find out
who they were before they succumbed to illness, their interest in seeing the
lawsuits through to completion would grow to at least $10,000 (but quite
possibly more) in case (2) and at least $100,000 (but likely more) in case (3).119
Focusing narrowly on the 1:1,000,000 and 1:10,000,000 risks in cases (2) and
(3), respectively, utterly ignores this additional complexity. Thus, a court that
rejects the first case on justiciability grounds imposes a general welfare cost of
$38,000, but individual welfare costs of just $0.01 per plaintiff, whereas a court
that .rejects the second or third case acquiesces in the imposition of losses of
$10,000 or $100,000 (or more), respectively, on those few who eventually get
sick.
The main point here is that the injuriousness of a risky policy or action
depends not only on the average risk to exposed individuals but also on the size
of the affected population and the nature of the anticipated harm 2° The
importance of population size has led other authors to argue that U.S. agencies,
including the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and even the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, should focus on population risk in their regulatory
efforts.' 2 But one need not agree with this prescriptive argument to see that, as
a practical matter, assessing individual risk to named plaintiffs as part of the
116. Note, though, that pre-illness estimates of the level at which people value living a healthy life
are notoriously inaccurate. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IowA L. REv. 1293,
1333 (2007) (noting that using willingness-to-pay techniques to estimate the value of life generates
numbers that range over two orders of magnitude); Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness
to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 205, 205-13 (2004) (discussing and critiquing willingness-to-pay tech-
niques).
117. The tradeoffs for the company could be different, of course, as in case (1) FPL could make the
plaintiffs whole by paying out $38,000, whereas the costs to the company of addressing the pollution
problems in cases (2) and (3) may not correlate with the societal costs that the pollution is imposing.
118. Given the numbers above, the expected number of illnesses in the second case is 3.8 per year of
misconduct (3.8 million times 1/1,000,000); in the third case it is 0.38 per year of misconduct (3.8
million times 1/10,000,000).
119. See, e.g., Masur, supra note 116, at 1333 (discussing the imprecision of willingness-to-pay
measures for estimating the value of life or health). For case (3), the estimation problem is even more
serious, because (by hypothesis) the illness is incurable. See id.
120. For further discussion of the illogic of ignoring the magnitude of the anticipated harm, see
supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
121. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 110, at 1124, 1130, 1241 ("Both welfare consequentialism and
alternative moral views generally demand that regulatory criteria for addressing hazards attend to the
number of persons incurring various levels of (Bayesian) risk from the hazards.").
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standing inquiry is a fundamentally misguided way to identify either the cases
of greatest general interest or the cases of greatest significance to those particu-
lar individuals who will eventually suffer realized harms due to the challenged
agency action. '
22
A third significant problem with a standing threshold that turns .on the
"substantiality" of the increase in risk concerns the necessarily incremental
nature of policymaking. Agencies implement policies in incremental steps-
year by year, pollutant by pollutant, or industry by industry.1 23 As a result, the
riskiness of an individual agency action may drastically understate the riskiness
of the guiding agency policy. The full risk will not be realized until the agency
implements the full policy, yet plaintiffs often must challenge the first appear-
ance of the policy or chance losing the opportunity to challenge the policy at
all. 124 Put differently, public litigants only have an opportunity to challenge
agencies' broad policies in specific cases in which the policies' overall harmful-
ness to the plaintiffs may not be evident. By rejecting suits premised on tiny
risks, the D.C. Circuit therefore insulates broad and often highly risky agency
policies from judicial oversight for the sole, unsatisfying reason that the first
instantiation of the policy, considered by itself, poses only a tiny risk. As I have
argued elsewhere in the context of ripeness, 125 the net result is, effectively,
judicially sanctioned path dependence: The agency takes its first step and then,
hearing silence from the courts, continues down what may well be, considered
in toto, an unlawful and highly risky path.
Relatedly, it is not clear what baseline the D.C. Circuit does or should use to
evaluate the "substantiality" of a risk. That is, what difference is relevant,
theoretically or practically? Is it that between the risk imposed by the agency's
action and the identical preexisting risk? Or that between the ex post risk and
some measure of the risk sanctioned by applicable substantive law? At the
standing argument in Public Citizen, Judge Randolph suggested that the proper
baseline is the riskiness of whatever alternative approach the plaintiff suggested
to the agency during the rulemaking comment period. 126 In most cases, though,
the plaintiffs' litigation obligation is to place all relevant legal and factual issues
122. The fact that the individuals who will get sick do not yet know who they are does not negate
their significant present interest in averting that outcome-it just makes them less likely and less able to
press their case with a court.
123. For two prime examples of this fact, see NRDC 1, 440 E3d 476, 479-80 (D.C. Cir. 2006) and
NRDC /, 464 E3d 1, 3-5 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (reviewing an EPA rule that allowed use of a particular
amount of the pesticide methyl bromide for a single year, 2005).
124. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 909, 911-12 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In the
context of a retrospective determination of the ripeness of an untimely claim, the court noted that "[iut
is the duty of the court to make the prudential judgment whether a challenge to agency action is ripe; it
is the responsibility of petitioners to file for review within the period set by Congress." Id. at 912.
125. Amanda C. Cohen, Recent Development, Ripeness Revisited: The Implications of Ohio Forestry
Association v. Sierra Club for Environmental Litigation, 23 HARv. ENm. L. REv. 547, 548, 556-61
(1999).
126. Oral Argument, Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 513 F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (notes on file with author).
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before the agency, not to propose particular approaches to addressing those
issues. 127 More fundamentally, it makes little sense to suggest that with passag6
of the APA's notice-and-comment requirements-which, among other things,
work to democratize agencies by increasing public involvement in the rulemak-
ing process-Congress created a procedural hurdle of constitutional dimen-
sions: submit an alternative approach under which the plaintiff would suffer
significantly less risk or face dismissal of any subsequent legal challenge for
lack of standing. Concerned regulatory beneficiaries must play the procedural
game in order to give the agency a reasonable opportunity to consider potential
legal and factual objections to any proposed policy approach, 128 but the burden
to devise an alternative approach that comports with governing law surely lies
with the agency, not with the commenting public.
The fifth important flaw in the practical application of the D.C. Circuit
standing threshold is the significant hurdle that it places in the way of even the
most important lawsuits. Under the D.C. Circuit precedents, plaintiffs bear the
burden of establishing the substantiality of the challenged risk in their first
substantive filing to the court129a requirement that may necessitate conduct-
ing extensive interviews, preparing myriad affidavits, hiring statistical experts,
and perhaps even developing new statistical models. 130 Yet the height of this
litigation hurdle has less to do with the importance of the legal question in the
case than with the nature of the risk and the difficulty of establishing the
statistical link between the risk and the underlying agency action-the trickier
the science, the more work the plaintiffs must do to substantiate the alleged
risks.131 Imposing this litigation burden therefore threatens to weed out cases in
which the plaintiff is cash-strapped or the connection between the agency policy
and the resulting risk is scientifically complicated, rather than cases in which the
link is tenuous, the resulting risk is truly small, or the legal question is
unimportant.
Overall, then, the D.C. Circuit standing threshold ignores the real differences
among increased-risk cases. As such, the threshold has little to offer judges who
are concerned, constitutionally or practically, about an explosion of such cases.
B. SHARPER TOOLS
There is a different answer to the practicality question though: It is not at all
127.. See, e.g., Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1297-98 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("It is a
hard and fast rule of administrative law, rooted in simple fairness, that issues not raised before an
agency are waived and will not be considered by a court on review." (citing United States v. L.A.
Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952))).
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d 1279, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
130. Public Citizen 11, 513 F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), provides one data point: the
plaintiffs' supplementary standing filings exceeded 200 pages and cost more than $50,000 to produce.
Conversation with Allison Zieve, Public Citizen Attorney (July 28, 2008).
131. For example, substantiating some health risks may require extensive laboratory testing or
modeling.
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clear that the D.C. Circuit's perceived problem-too many increased-risk
cases-is real. Several well-established safeguards already prevent plaintiffs
from mounting successful challenges to every exercise of agency discretion.
Most obviously, the rewards of a successful challenge-remand to the agency
and sometimes attorneys' fees-provide little financial incentive to file ill-
considered or frivolous lawsuits premised on insignificant risks. Therefore,
when an individual or organization chooses to target an agency action that
appears to impose only a tiny risk, the suit may well be a piece of a broader
litigation agenda. (For example, the plaintiff may have identified the action as
the first in a likely series of similar actions, or as the initial phase in the
implementation of a new and highly risky agency policy.) Further, plaintiffs
who choose to proceed must identify a cause of action under a governing
statute; they must establish both that the agency has a "legal duty" and that they
have the "right to enforce.. . [that] duty." 132 Cases that challenge completely
unconstrained exercises of agency discretion are thus doomed from the start.
On the merits, Chevron deference, 133 both statutorily and judicially created
rules of prosecutorial discretion,134 and the APA's arbitrary-and-capricious re-
view standard 135 give judges ample room to defer to, or simply to decline to
review, all but the most blatantly unlawful agency policy choices. As the
Second Circuit recognized in Baur v. Veneman, even if one is concerned about
the effect on separation of powers principles of "lawsuits that assert no more
than 'generalized grievances,"' courts "need not enshrine, as a matter of consti-
tutional principle, barriers to suit that may be addressed through other, poten-
tially more flexible"-but less easily manipulated--constraints on jurisdiction
and judicial interventionism.
1 36
The D.C. Circuit appears to have turned this insight on its head, applying the
substantiality-of-the-risk standing threshold to allay, at least in part, concern
about the largely independent problems of agency causation and speculative and
diffuse injuries. Consider the first sentence of the quote from Public Citizen,
above: "Much government regulation slightly increases a citizen's risk of
injury-or insufficiently decreases the risk compared to what some citizens
might prefer." 137 The palpable concern underlying this characterization is that in
some cases, plaintiffs sue about preexisting risks-that is, risks that are not truly
132. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 291.
133. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
134. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000) (noting that judicial review is unavailable for actions
"committed to agency discretion by law"); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832, 837-38
(1985) (holding that in most circumstances, the Administrative Procedure Act does not provide for
judicial review of agency decisions not to bring enforcement actions); cf Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.
Ct. 1438, 1459 (2007) (noting that unlike nonenforcement decisions, denials of rulemaking petitions are
"susceptible to judicial review, though such review is 'extremely limited' and 'highly deferential"'
(internal citations omitted)).
135. See.5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
136. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 636 (2d Cir. 2003).
137. Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
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caused by the agency's action. And, the Court continued, recognizing standing
in such cases would throw wide the courthouse doors and "expand the 'proper-
and properly limited'-constitutional role of the Judicial Branch beyond decid-
ing actual cases or controversies."13 8 A passage in NRDC II makes the same
point about speculative injuries:
Environmental and health injuries often are purely probabilistic. We have
cautioned that this category of injury may be too expansive. "[W]ere all
purely speculative 'increased risks' deemed injurious, the entire requirement
of 'actual or imminent injury' would be rendered moot, because all hypoth-
esized, nonirnminent 'injuries' could be dressed up as 'increased risk of future
injury."'
1 39
That is, entertaining claims premised on speculative risks would allow courts to
overstep their constitutional role.
Two simple examples suffice to establish that a standing bar is inadequate to
weed out cases involving either inadequate causation -or overly speculative
injury. First, consider the risk of death in car accidents, and various potential
lawsuits over (hypothetical) Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations
requiring automobile manufacturers to install airbags. At least three such law-
suits seem eminently plausible:
(1) Assume DOT has a clear statutory duty to reduce the risk of injury in car
accidents by a particular date. Based on this mandate, plaintiffs could sue the
agency, at some point after the statutory date, for failing to issue a rule requiring
installation of airbags.
(2) Now suppose DOT issues a rule requiring installation of driver- and
passenger-side airbags. Plaintiffs could challenge this rule for failing also to
require installation of side-impact airbags.
(3) Alternatively, a group of small adults and children who could be injured
or killed during airbag deployment could challenge the same rule for creating a
risk to them.
In Suit (1), the risk of death or injury in a car accident is what it has always
been-the allegation is that the agency did nothing to reduce that risk. In Suit
(2), the risk was higher before the agency published its rule; the rule reduced
that risk, just (allegedly) not as much as the law required. Finally, in Suit (3),
the plaintiff complains of a risk that would not have existed but for the agency's
rule.
These cases differ in ways that courts should and do find relevant. For
example, depending on the terms of the governing statute, the plaintiffs in Suit
(1) would probably have to establish that they petitioned the agency to issue an
138. Id. (internal citation omitted).
139. NRDC II, 464 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Ctr. For Law & Educ. v. Dep't of Educ., 396
F.3d 1152, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
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airbag rule, that the agency refused, and that the agency's refusal violated the
terms of either the governing law or the APA. Suits (2) and (3) could proceed
without a rulemaking petition, but their likelihood of success would also depend
on the scope of the agency's mandate-albeit in different ways than for Suit
(1).140
Importantly though, a substantiality-of-the-risk standing threshold does noth-
ing to elucidate these differences. Indeed, in the above example, the plaintiffs in
the least plausible suit-Suit (1), which challenges agency inaction-are in the
best position to allege substantial injury because they can blame the agency for
the entirety of their accident risk: "If only the agency had done something," they
can say, their risk of dying in an automobile accident would be significantly
reduced. Thus, these plaintiffs would satisfy the substantiality requirement even
though the agency did not create the identified risk.14 1 Suit (3), by contrast, has
the most traditional form: The plaintiffs allege that they now face a risk that
they would not have faced but for the agency rule. Yet the size of the alleged
risk is small relative to the risk in Suit (1).142 Thus, these plaintiffs might fail to
satisfy the substantiality requirement even though they challenge an agency
action that created a risk to them. As these examples illustrate, a substantiality-
of-the-risk threshold provides an inadequate and at times inaccurate filter for
insufficient causation.
The second example establishes that likewise, the size of a risk says little
about whether it is speculative. Consider the circumstances of NRDC I and H.
NRDC challenged an EPA rule that allowed the use of a certain amount of an
ozone-depleting pesticide. 143 The organization complained about the health-
related risks to its members associated with increased UV-exposure due to
ozone depletion. 144 The size of those risks hinged on two quantitative factors:
(1) the amount of pesticide use allowed by the challenged rule, and (2) various
statistical estimates of the degree to which the risk might grow or shrink at each
140. "[W]here... the [plaintiff's] claim is not that [an existing] regulation is substantively unlawful,
or even that it violates a clear procedural prerequisite, but rather that it was 'arbitrary' and 'capricious'
[for the agency] not to conduct [a new or] amendatory rulemaking .... [t]he proper procedure. for
pursuit of [the] grievance is set forth explicitly in the APA: a petition to the agency for rulemaking,
denial of which must be justified by a statement of reasons, and can be appealed to the courts." Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 459 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
141. This is not to suggest that the plaintiffs in Suit (1) would not or should not have a cause of
action if the agency failed to meet its statutory obligation to address the risk of injury from car
accidents. Rather, it merely suggests that a court hoping to weed out cases involving dubious causation
cannot address that concern by evaluating the substantiality of the plaintiff's risk.
142. A recent study, for example, indicates that on average, about 1 in 100 children in crashes were
seated in the front passenger seat and thus "exposed to an air bag deployment." See Kristy B. Arbogast
et al., Injury Risk to Restrained Children Exposed to Deployed First- and Second-Generation Air Bags
in Frontal Crashes, 159 ARcivES PEDIATRIcs & ADOLFScENT MED. 342, 342-43 (2005). Of the children
so exposed, the risk of serious injury from exposure to deployed second-generation passenger air bags
was 9.9%. Id. at 342. The risk to children who are in serious crashes is thus just .099% (1% times
9.9%), and the risk to all children who ride in cars is considerably lower.
143. See supra note I and accompanying text.
144. See NRDC 1, 440 F.3d 476, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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intervening step in the chain of causation from rule-passage to health-harm.
The former factor relies on a simple correlation: The greater the quantity of
pesticide allowed by the rule, the greater the potential for future ozone deple-
tion. The latter factor is far more complicated, involving numerous steps, some
predictable and some less so, including -actual methyl bromide usage (because
farmers could choose to use less methyl bromide than allowed by the agency's
rule); usage levels of other ozonie-depleting chemicals in the U.S. and elsewhere
(because methyl bromide is not the only or even the most potent ozone-
depleting chemical); weather patterns (because ozone breakdown depends on
both sunlight and the presence of ozone-depleting compounds); and NRDC-
members' medical histories, occupational and recreational practices, and use of
sunscreen (because UV-risk depends on susceptibility as well as exposure). It
should be clear, then, that any number that purports to estimate the "size" or
"substantiality" of a risk actually conflates two uncorrelated factors-the scale
of the agency's action (that is, how big a regulatory step the agency took in its
rule) and the number and nature of the links in the chain of causation (that is,
how many and what sort of intervening steps must occur before the agency's
action results in on-the-ground harm to the plaintiffs). One cannot gain insight
into both of these unrelated issues by asking a binary question about the
"substantiality" of the risk.
Returning to the practicality question posed at the start of Part IV, the second
part of the answer is that traditional justiciability and deference doctrines may
adequately filter increased-risk cases. Further, using the size of a risk as a proxy
for concerns about causation and speculativeness is neither accurate nor informa-
tive. Thus, there may be no need for a substantiality-of-the-risk standing
threshold, and using such a threshold threatens to confuse.
IV. THE ARGUMENT FROM INSTITUTIONAL ROLES
Even if one could fix some of the standing threshold's practical flaws, the
very idea of a justiciability limit that hinges on the substantiality of the risk to
the plaintiff exhibits profound confusion about the institutional roles of Con-
gress, the agencies, and the courts.
Consider first the role of the Judiciary vis-A-vis Congress. In many situations,
Congress has clearly recognized a risk (for example that associated with air
pollution or with injuries in car accidents), directed an agency to address that
risk, and enlisted citizen attorneys general to ensure that the agency complies
with its statutory duty. 145 Implicit in the resulting legislation is the creation of a
legally enforceable right to benefit from the agency's action in the manner and
to the degree envisioned by Congress. Also implicit is a reduction in the degree
of power delegated to the Executive. The agency to which Congress has granted
145. See, e.g., Edward Lloyd, Citizen Suits and Defenses Against Them, (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course
Study, June 25-28, 2008), WL SN085 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 847 app. A (listing federal citizen suit provisions).
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regulatory authority has the power to act only in compliance with. Congress's
policy choices, 146 as detailed in the relevant statutes and interpreted first by the
agency and later (with deference) by the courts. Moreover, it is up to Congress
to decide whether and to what degree the agencies are free to neglect their
statutory responsibilities:
If Congress wants to create a statutory scheme that may lapse in desuetude if
the Executive Branch decides not to implement it, Congress is free to specify
(as it occasionally does) that there shall be no private right to compel any
enforcement of the scheme. If, on the other hand, Congress does not wish a
particular program to be lost in vast bureaucratic hallways, ... Congress
[may] enable any citizen to demand implementation of the statutory scheme. 147
In the former situation, there is no cause of action and thus no room for the
court to apply a standing threshold. In the latter situation, though, a court that
uses a substantiality-of-the-risk threshold to determine which citizen attorneys
general have standing redefines the legal injury as limited to beneficiaries facing
substantial risk, and thus revisits legislative choices Congress has already made.
This outcome is doubly problematic. Not only does the court second-guess the
legislators' determination that citizen attorneys general are needed "to demand
implementation of the statutory scheme,"'148 but it also usurps the patently
legislative responsibility of determining what sorts and levels of risk society
should tolerate.
In short, by means of a superficially objective discussion of risk statistics, the
court attains precisely the outcome that critics of Lujan denounced: "A clear
statutory expression of authority [to sue falls] before the notoriously amorphous
demand for a constitutional 'case."",149 The problem is more serious in the D.C.
Circuit than in the Supreme Court, however, because the Lujan Court identified
a constitutional flaw that Congress could easily remedy by specifying the injury
more clearly and relating that injury to the plaintiff class.' 50 In contrast, the
D.C. Circuit posits a constitutional flaw that Congress lacks authority to rem-
edy. In the D.C. Circuit, no statute, no matter how specific and well-drafted,
146. See, e.g., La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) ("[A]n agency literally has
no power to act ... unless and until Congress confers power upon it.").
147. Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 Thx. L. REv. 73, 103-04 (2007) (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 104.
149. Nichol, supra note 21, at 1147. As Judge William A. Fletcher put it almost twenty years ago:
In the case of a statutory right, Congress is the source both of the legal obligation and of the
definition of the class of those entitled to enforce it.... So long as the substantive rule is
constitutionally permissible, Congress should have plenary power to create statutory duties
and to provide enforcement mechanisms for them, including the creation of causes of action in
plaintiffs who act as "private attorneys general."
Fletcher, supra note 15, at 251; see also Siegel, supra note 147, at 103-05 (discussing Congress's role
and powers in relation to standing).
150. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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may recognize tiny, risks as legally cognizable. Thus, the standing threshold
permanently and irremediably limits congressional authority to, in the words of
Justice Kennedy, "define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before."'
' 5 1
In addition, the standing threshold muddies the role of courts vis-t-vis
agencies. Specifically, the doctrine elevates to a constitutional concern the
factual question of whether the agency's action creates a "substantial" risk for
the plaintiff, and simultaneously places responsibility for establishing the size
and substantiality of the risk squarely on the plaintiff.152 As a result, the
threshold creates a predicate factual question for the court, with regards to
which no deference is due (because the issue is now one of constitutional
interpretation), even though the agency has greater risk-assessment expertise
and may already have performed a detailed scientific risk assessment and
provided a quantitative estimate of the likely impacts of its rule. 1
53
Finally, it is important to note that in some cases, imposition of a standing threshold
enables the court to shirk even its "proper-and properly limited- - ' 54 constitutional
role. Specifically, agencies sometimes create risks to subsets of the population
as a side effect of unrelated policy choices-for example, the risk to children
and small adults from the hypothetical seatbelt rule. 155 In such cases, even if the
risk is tiny, the plaintiffs are in the classic and generally approved litigating
position: a minority facing a harm imposed by (the agent of) the majority.
156
Imposing a quantitative standing threshold in these cases thus bars precisely the
sorts of actions we expect and depend on courts to entertain.
CONCLUSION
Needless to say, courts need not provide a judicial remedy to all plaintiffs
who can demonstrate that agency action or inaction has placed them (or left
151. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
152. In Public Citizen I, for example, the courf's interim opinion instructed the parties to file
additional briefs "addressing (i) whether [the challenged agency action] creates a substantial increase in
the risk of death, physical, injury, or property loss ... , and (ii) whether the ultimate risk of harm to
which Public Citizen's members are exposed, including the increase allegedly due to [the challenged]
action, is 'substantial."' Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d 1279, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
153. See Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc at 6, NRDC 1, 440 F.3d 476 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (No. 04-1438) ("According to EPA's own risk assessments, releases of methyl bromide under
the [challenged] rule will cause thousands of U.S. cases of cancer and cataracts.").
154. Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d at 1295.
155. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997) ("The irreplaceable value of the power
articulated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall [in Marbury v. Madison] lies in the protection it has afforded
the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive or
discriminatory government action. It is this role, not some amorphous general supervision of the
operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for the federal courts and has permitted
the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic
principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis rests." (quoting United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted))).
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them) at risk. Even if such expansive judicial oversight of agency action were
constitutional and desirable, it would be impossible to implement. Human life
is-and agency actions are-fraught with risk; granting a remedy to anyone
who complains that an agency failed adequately to reduce her risk of snake bite,
shark attack, or lightning strike would give judges significant and unconstitu-
tional power to review and reorder regulatory priorities. Of necessity, then,
Congress and the courts must draw some lines between cognizable risk-based
injuries and unreviewable exercises of agency discretion.
There is no need, however, for a new, judicially created, and under-theorized
standing threshold to police this territory. Congress has already drawn some
lines in the form of statutory citizen-suit provisions. If those lines are improvi-
dently drawn-a question of numbers on which this Article takes no view-
Congress could fix the problem by narrowing citizen suit provisions, perhaps
requiring, for instance, that plaintiffs challenging pollution regulations live
within some radius of the regulated smokestacks, or that those challenging
automobile safety regulations drive a certain number of miles each year. Courts,
too, have identified lines by refining the requirements of causation and redress-
ability and developing doctrines of prosecutorial discretion and deference.
Adding assumption-laden and eminently manipulable risk estimates to this mix
serves only to hide hard questions under a veneer of superficially simple but.
contested and largely misdirected mathematics.
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